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Abstract
The period 1962-89 witnessed a remarkable transformation of the South Korean economy, from
being poverty ridden to the attainment of the status of newly industrialised nation. This
transformation was achieved through the adoption of an outward oriented industry led strategy,
based, particularly during the period of the 1970s, upon the development of large-scale industrial
conglomerates and the attainment of economies of scale and technology to achieve international
competitiveness. By the early 1980s this strategy had resulted in major structural imbalances, a
weakened financial section, heavy concentration in domestic markets, and a repressed
development of small and medium enterprises. By the end of the 1980s, despite attempts at
economic reform during this decade, the structural and financial problems remained which were to
prove the country’s undoing during the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98.
This issue of whether Korea’s performance during this period can be described as an economic
miracle is also reviewed. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed and no conclusive evidence
can be drawn. However, despite this, the achievements of the Korean economy during the period
under discussion should not be underestimated.

1.

Introduction

Following the devastation of the Korea War (1950-53) South Korea was one of the poorest
countries in the world 1 . During the period 1953 to 1961 the economy experienced a slow
recovery from the war, considerable dependence upon assistance from the US, an economic
policy focused on import substitution, and massive investment in education. While the emphasis
on import substitution was a mistake, private and public investment in education would later
provide a well-educated labour force that would form the backbone of the labour intensive
industries developed from the early 1960s. Even in 1960, after the damage inflicted during the
war had been repaired, Korea’s per capita income was still only US$79 in current prices, much
lower than that of most of its neighbouring countries. Few, if any, observers at this time were
optimistic about an improvement in Korea’s poverty stricken economy (see for example Song
(1990), p.57 and Tae (1972), pp.40-41).
With the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan (1962-66), however, a remarkable transformation
of the economy took place that was to catapult Korea to the status of Newly Industrialising
Country (NIC) by 1970 (Song (1990), p.1) 2. Over the longer period 1962-89 per capita income
increased from US$87 to US$5,199, the economy’s GDP expanded from US$2.3 billion to
US$220.7 billion, and exports increased from US$55 million to US$61.4 billion. The
normalisation of relations with Japan in 1965, fiscal and financial reforms in the mid 1960s aimed
at maintaining stabilisation of the economy, supplying materials for the Vietnam War, the Middle
East construction boom in the 1970s, low oil prices, a cheap US dollar, and low interest rates in
the late 1980s, all facilitated this rise (Song (1990), p.1). The period of the 1960s and 1970s in
particular were also characterised by a favourable international environment for economic
development. The US led free trade environment of the 1960s and 1970s based on the IMF and
the GATT system gave a boost to Korea’s development policy. Korea continued its rapid growth
during the 1970s despite the two oil crises, and by the late 1980s had joined the highest income
developing countries group. An economic ‘miracle on the River Han’3 appeared to have occurred.
The paper examines the major factors behind this remarkable transformation of the economy,
during the period 1962-89, and in doing so proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews
developments in key macroeconomic variables during the period Section 3 focuses upon the
features of Korea’s rapid growth, its pattern, and sources, business cycles, and related issues.
Section 4 conducts an overview of Korea’s economic performance in the context of the ‘Asian
economic miracle’. Finally, section 5 presents a summary of the major conclusions from this
paper.
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The war cost the lives of over 1 million people and destroyed about half of the country’s infrastructure. It also
destroyed traditional authority and class barriers, as well as traditional habits, making it easier to lay the
foundation for a more modern economy (Song (1990), p.3). A legacy of the war was the requirement by the South
to spend some 6 percent of its GNP on defence, to maintain the fifth largest standing army in the world (Lee
(1968)).
2
By this year the South had also overtaken the North in terms of per capita income.
3
The Han river is the major river running through Seoul, the capital city of South Korea.
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2.

Korea’s economic performance 1962-894

2.1

Overview

A remarkable transformation of the economy began with the introduction of the First Five Year
Plan (1962-66) (see Table 1). Over the period 1962-89 the economy achieved: an average annual
real GDP growth rate of 8.5 percent; per capita income increased from US$87 to US$5,199;
GDP in current prices increased from US$2.3 billion to US$220.7 billion; the savings rate
increased from 3.3 percent to 35.4 percent; the investment rate increased from 12.8 percent to
35.9 percent; and the rate of unemployment fell from 9.8 percent to 2.6 percent. In terms of
external developments the trade balance was in deficit by US$335 million in 1962 but was in
surplus by US$4.6 billion 1989; exports were a negligible US$55 million in 1962 but a sizable
US$61.4 billion in 1989. The country’s foreign debt, however, increased from US$157 million in
1963 to over US$3 billion by 1989. Within a single generation the country was transformed from
being heavily dependent upon foreign aid in the early 1960s, to becoming self sufficient in terms
of its own funding requirements by the end of 1986. The remainder of this section is devoted to
analysing the development of these key macroeconomic variables.
2.2

Growth pattern and characteristics

During the period 1962-89 Korea’s high growth slumped badly only once – in 1980 – due to the
socio-political unrest following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979
and the subsequent re-establishment of military rule in May 1980, compounded by the worst
harvest since 1962 and the second global oil price hike. A number of factors accounted for the
overall rapid and sustained growth of the economy: the adoption of a growth strategy focusing
upon exports; the development of growth promoting institutions and public policies; high quality
workers and entrepreneurs; a technological backlog available to Korea as a latecomer; efficient
usage of public resources for infrastructure development and education; population control; the
capacity of entrepreneurs and policy makers to adjust rapidly and flexibly to external shocks; and
maintenance of a relatively equitable income distribution.
A number of key characteristics of Korea’s growth can be identified. First, the rapid
transformation to high economic growth was primarily initiated by an expansion of exports (Song
(1990), p.58, Lee (1996), p.18, Smith (2000a), p.60), sustained by the growth of export
industries, the provision of investment resources through the government’s active involvement in
the market, and macroeconomic stabilization measures.

4

The year 1989 was a watershed year for Korea for three main reasons. First, per capita GDP attained the
US$5,000 level in 1989 for the first time in history. Second, four consecutive years of current account surpluses
ended in 1989. Third, the country officially graduated in 1989 from the status of a developing country at GATT.
2

Table 1 Major indicators of Korean economic growth 1960-89
GDP per GDP Real GDP CPI Savings Investment Trade Exports Foreign Unemploy. Exchange
capita (US$b) growth
(US$)*

(%)

ratio

(%)

rate (%)

ratio

balance (US$m)

(%)

(US$ m)

debt

rate (%) rate

(US$m.)

(won/US$)

1960

79

2

1.2

na

0.8

10.9

-273

33

-

11.7

65

1961

82

2.1

5.9

na

2.8

13.2

-242

41

-

12.7

130

1962

87

2.3

2.1

na

3.3

12.8

-335

55

-

9.8

130

1963

100

2.7

9.1

na

8.7

18.1

-410

87

157

8.2

130

1964

103

2.9

9.7

na

8.7

14.0

-245

120

177

7.7

256

1965

105

3

5.7

na

7.4

15.0

-241

175

206

7.4

272.1

1966

125

3.6

12.2

12

11.8

21.6

-430

250

392

7.1

271.5

1967

142

4.2

5.9 10.7

11.4

21.9

-574

335

645

6.2

274.6

1968

169

5.2

11.3 11.3

15.1

25.9

-836

486

1199

5.1

281.5

1969

210

6.5

13.8 11.6

18.8

28.8

-992

658

1800

4.8

304.5

1970

248

8

8.8 16.9

16.2

24.6

-992

882

2245

4.5

316.7

1971

286

9.4

8.6 12.2

14.5

25.1

-1044

1133

2922

4.5

373.2

1972

316

10.6

4.9 11.9

15.7

20.9

-574

1676

3589

4.5

398.9

1973

396

13.5

3.5

21.4

24.7

-566

3284

4260

4

397.5

1974

542

18.8

7.4 24.8

19.3

31.8

-1938

4516

5937

4.1

484

1975

598

21.1

6.5 24.7

16.9

27.5

-1671

5003

8456

4.1

484

1976

806

28.9

11.2 15.4

22.2

25.7

-590

7814

10533

3.9

484

1977

1019

37.1

10

25.4

27.7

-477

10046

12648

3.8

484

1978

1407

52

9 14.7

27.3

31.9

-1780

12711

14871

3.2

484

1979

1649

61.9

7.1 18.5

26.5

36

-4395

14705

20287

3.8

484

1980

1632

62.2

-2.1 28.7

20.8

32.1

-4384

17214

27170

5.2

659.9

1981

1797

69.6

6.5 21.3

20.5

30.3

-3849

20747

32433

4.5

700.5

1982

1892

74.4

7.2

7.1

20.9

28.6

-2827

20934

37083

4.4

748.8

1983

2062

82.3

10.7

3.4

25.3

29.9

-1849

23272

40378

4.1

795.5

1984

2242

90.6

8.2

2.2

27.9

31.9

-1089

26486

43053

3.8

827.4

1985

2289

93.4

6.5

2.3

28.6

31.1

-19

26442

46729

4

890.2

1986

2611

107.6

11

2.8

32.8

30.2

4299

34128

44500

3.8

861.4

1987

3248

135.2

11

3.1

36.8

37.7

7529

46560

35600

3.1

792.3

1988

4302

180.8

10.5

7.1

38.6

39.1

11283

59973

31500

2.5

684.1

1989

5199

220.7

6.1

5.7

35.4

35.9

4597

61408

2.6

680

12.3

10

* GNP per capita before 1970

Notes: GNP and GNP per capita are in current prices. The rate of inflation is based on the GNP deflator. The rate of interest is the ba
interest rate on time deposits for the period of one or more years.
Sources:
Song (1990), pp. 60-61
Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr)
National Statistical Office (http://www.nso.go.kr)
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Where investment could not be provided by the private sector alone, particularly during the early
stages of economic development, the government used its own investment resources for the
construction of key industries and for the formation of social overhead capital. Many export
industries, and indeed the economy as a whole during the early stages of its development, was
subject to extensive involvement by the government, and the country’s initial export expansion
was effectively ‘forced’ by the actions of the government (Song (1990), p.58). The basic
philosophy of the Park Chung Hee government was “exports first”, or “nation building through
export promotion”. Attaining ambitious government set export targets, and then exceeding these
targets, was regarded as the height of achievement for businessmen and public officials in charge
of export promotion. Larger Korean firms were assigned annual export targets by officials in the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and were seen by these firms as virtual orders or assigned
missions. If they succeeded in fulfilling their export goals they obtained numerous benefits
reserved for exporters, including preferential credit and loans, administrative support, tax and
other benefits. Thus Korean exporters saw the over-fulfillment of their export targets – usually
determined jointly with the government – as the keystone of their business strategy. By the 1970s,
however, increased focus was given to the development of import substituting strategic heavy and
chemical industries (HCIs), as well as maintaining the export growth of light manufactured
industries and the development of new heavy goods exports. The 1980s saw a refocusing upon
trade liberalization including an opening up of domestic markets and a reduction in export
subsidies, arising from pressure from trading partners.
Second, the country experienced high but volatile economic growth. Economic fluctuations in the
1950s had not been extreme, in part because year-to-year fluctuations, in the then largely
agricultural economy, reflected only variations in crop yields due to such things as the weather.
Such fluctuations were not extreme because of a stable climate and extensive irrigation. With the
decrease in the relative weight of agriculture, and the rise in the proportion of the manufacturing
and services industries, in GDP, the nature of the fluctuations changed and tended to become
larger and more unpredictable. From the 1960s, because of the growth first development policy,
the economy experienced more year-to-year fluctuations. Since the scale of the Korean economy
was relatively small well into the 1970s, the growth rate was also susceptible to large fluctuations
caused by construction phases in large investment projects. The economy’s outward orientation
also exposed it to fluctuations from oil price hikes and other external influences. The inexperience
of policy makers, especially during the 1960s, also contributed to economic fluctuations.
Third, many Korean industries were initially developed on the basis of the export first principle.
This strategy resulted in Korean firms marketing their products in overseas markets rather than in
domestic markets, as in the case of the colour TV industry. As the domestic sale of colour TVs
was not allowed until 1980, colour TV manufacturing firms had to sell their products in overseas
markets. Other examples included industries producing high value items such as phonographs,
portable telephones, and mink coats. Korea’s export first principle of industrial expansion was in
direct contrast with the Japanese pattern of industrial growth, which was based on the domestic
market first principle. Because of the forced nature of the growth of many industries in Korea, the
share of manufacturing in GDP was larger than the average or normal level in other countries.
Also, the shift in the production structure from agriculture to manufacturing in Korea was faster
than the pattern typically observed in other developing or developed countries. In the 1970s
greater focus was placed upon the development of strategic HCIs, which further contributed to
the rapid growth of the country’s industrial conglomerates. Increased structural imbalance in the
economy by the 1980s between sectors and size of enterprises contributed to greater emphasis on
the need to reduce market concentration, increase competition and encourage the growth of small
4

and medium enterprises.
Fourth, as the expansion of industrial capacity tended to be excessive, the amount of domestic
investment generally exceeded the amount of domestic savings (see Table 1). In addition, much of
this domestic saving was diverted into real estate as a hedge against high inflation. Hence, the
level of available domestic saving in Korea was lower than that required to meet the productive
investment needs of the country. This gap had to be filled through foreign borrowing, and this,
along with the need to import oil and many other industrial raw materials, explains why Korea’s
foreign debt continued to rise until 1985 (see Table 1). The amount of foreign capital inflow into
Korea was higher than that for other countries at a similar stage of economic development (see
Table 2). Also, the debt to equity ratio of large Korean firms, forced to over-expand their
production and export capacity, tended to be higher than that of other Asian newly industrialised
countries (NICs). Korean growth was, therefore, characterised by domestic investment exceeding
domestic savings, a high debt-equity ratio for most firms, and a large foreign debt.
Fifth, since for much of the period under discussion the priority of policy was the expansion of
exports, and HCI industries, investment in social overhead capital received low priority and
usually lagged far behind investment in directly productive activities. This was exacerbated by
insufficient investment resources and relatively high defence expenditures 5 . Korean industries,
therefore, grew in the face of shortages and bottlenecks with respect to infrastructure resources.
The Korean economy’s growth, therefore, occurred due to investments in directly productive
activities rather than in social overhead facilities. It was not until the second half of the 1980s that
Korea’s social capital expenditure was expanded sharply as a result of the preparation for the
1988 Olympic Games.
Sixth, the expansion of industrial capacity in Korea was achieved through an expansion of existing
firms rather than through the creation of new firms. This pattern persisted for over two decades
and resulted in the growth of a small number of very large firms and business conglomerates
(chaebols), causing a large gap between large and small firms. The market concentration ratio in
Korea was much higher than in either of its regional neighbours, Japan or Taiwan. In Japan
growth was based on a significant number of very large firms as well as a large number of small
firms, while in Taiwan emphasis was placed on the development of small firms. Hence the Korean
economy may be called a large firm economy, in contrast to the small firm economy of Taiwan or
the bi-polar economy of Japan. As discussed below the government attempted to restrain market
concentration during the period of the 1980s in order to reverse the structural imbalance between
large and small enterprises.
Seventh, Korean growth was accompanied by trade and balance of payments deficits until 1985
(see Tables 1 and 2). This was caused, to some extent, by Korea’s resource poverty, but
principally due to the policy of allowing exporting companies to import raw materials, parts, and
machinery required for the production of export goods on a large scale. This has been called a
negative import substitution policy because exporting firms tried to import as much as possible.
From 1986, however, the trade and international balance of payments turned positive and Korea
changed from a young debtor nation to a mature debtor nation.
Eighth, during its period of rapid economic development Korea experienced sharply fluctuating
wholesale and consumer prices (see Table 1). Indeed from the early 1960s until 1981 Korea had
5

Since no peace treaty was signed after the war the South remained technically at war with the North.
5

the highest inflation rate among the Asian NICs. This was especially true when the economy was
hit by: oil price hikes; poor harvests; changes in government; and high levels of investment and
capacity building. This high inflation was mainly due to an excessive expansion of demand
associated with a rapid expansion of industrial capacity and the abnormal, compulsory, expansion
of exports. The aggressive export promotion and growth policy necessitated that the economy
had to consistently perform far beyond normal capacity, resulting in the forced expansion of
investment and output. This was particularly prevalent during the HCI drive of the 1970s. Overly
ambitious investment plans caused the inflationary financing of investment. Excessive investment
demand was, therefore, one of the links between the forced export growth strategy and the high
inflation that persisted until 1982.
The adverse consequences arising from this inflation were considerable. First, the high inflation
impacted upon income distribution by redistributing wealth from creditors to debtors. Second, the
high inflation rate often outstripped the government set bank interest rate, resulting in negative
real rates. This encouraged many Koreans, individuals and businesses, to divert their savings from
financial institutions to real estate, and significantly contributed to the reason why domestic
savings were insufficient to meet domestic investment requirements during the period of rapid
growth6. Third, high inflation contributed to an expansion of the unorganised credit market, or
‘curb market’, which in turn came to have a major role in mobilising and allocating investment
funds.
Price stability was finally achieved in Korea from 1982. Inflation was reduced from well over 20
percent per year during 1980-81 to 7 percent in 1982, remained at under 3.5 percent between
1983-87, before increasing to around 6-7 percent by 1988-89. The control of inflation after 1982
was due to both domestic and foreign factors. First, import costs fell due to the three lows,
namely low energy and raw materials prices, a depreciation of the US dollar, and low interest
rates. Second, the government shifted the direction of development from growth to stability.
Finally, labour productivity growth began to outstrip the growth of wages.

6

Despite this the domestic savings ratio, although starting from a low base of 3.3 percent in 1962, grew rapidly to
15.7 percent in 1972, to 20.9 percent in 1982, and to 35.4 percent in 1989 (see Table 1).
6

Table 2 Balance of payments, selected years, 1962-89 (US$ millions)
1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Trade balance(1) -335
Exports
55
Imports
390
Service balance(2) 43
Receipts
108
Payments
65
Transfers (net)(3) 236
Current account
balance(4)
(1+2+3)
-56
Long term capital
(net)(5)
8
Basic balance
(4+5) (6)
-48
Short term capital
(net)(7)
-7
Errors and
omissions
-2
Overall balance
(6+7)
-57
Gold and foreign
exchange reserves 167
Exchange rate
(won/US$)
130

-241 -922 -1671 -4384
-19
175 882 5003 17214 26442
416 1804 6674 21598 26461
46 119 -442 -1386 -1446
114 497 881 5363 6664
68 378 1323 6749 8111
203 180 227 449 578
9
37
46
-23

-623 -1887 -5321

1989
4597
61408
56811
210
12641
12431
247

-887

5055

449 1178 1857 1101

3362

-174 -709 -3464

213

1692

-588

60

-880

701

-36 -151 -1890 -1255

2453

122

-2

680 1944

16 -122

21

-370

138

584 1550 6571 7749 15245

272

317

484

660

890

680

Sources: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years;
Economic Indicators of Major Countries, March 1989; and Economic Planning
Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, various years.

Ninth, economic growth was accompanied by extensive investment in human resources. Total
expenditure, both public and private, on education regularly exceeded 10 percent of GDP, the
highest level among all the developing countries. The percentage of high school graduates
advancing to colleges or university during the period of the 1980s was the second highest in the
world after the US. This investment in education enabled Korean growth to be accompanied by a
high level of income equality that remained relatively unchanged during the course of
development.
Finally, government driven industrialisation resulted in an excessive concentration of industries
and population in large cities, especially in Seoul and the Seoul region. The level of urbanisation
in Korea was generally higher than the norm observed in other countries. As a result, such urban
problems as housing shortages, lack of educational facilities, and poor public services began to
emerge as serious domestic issues, in particular, after the 1970s.
2.3

Structural transformation

The rapid rate of growth of the economy resulted in a major transformation of its structure (see
Table 3). The share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 39.9 percent to 10.8 percent between
1960 and 1987, while the corresponding share of the non-agricultural sector increased from 60.1
percent to 89.2 percent. During the same period the share of industry in GDP increased
7

significantly from 18.6 to 43.2 percent. The structure of industrial output reflected two factors.
First, the country’s poor resource endowment, with the mining sector, for example, contributing
at its peak only 2.3 percent of GDP in 1960. Second, the significance of manufacturing sector
growth over the period 1960-87 arising from the export oriented growth strategy. The
contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP was only 12.1 percent in 1960 rising to 31.6
percent by 1987, with this latter figure being much higher than the average 23 percent observable
in advanced economies. The growth of the manufacturing sector, and its contribution to GDP, is
the most noticeable feature over this period.

3

Korea’s growth and trade promotion strategy

The major driving force behind the take off of economic growth was the adoption of an outward
looking industrialization strategy based on export promotion from the mid 1960s. The context for
this strategy, its stages and the evolving policy environment are now discussed.
3.1

Korea’s development legacy

Korea’s period of rapid economic growth, with its associated structure and distortions, was
profoundly shaped by a number of social and historical developments (see, for example, Song
(1990) and Amsden (1989)). These are: the country’s Confucian emphasis on education and
discipline; the legacy from the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945); and the division of
the country into North and South following the truce of July 1953. The latter two are now briefly
discussed.
Japan formally colonised Korea from 1910-45, but even before this time it had already introduced
a series of measures into traditional Korea that initiated the transformation of the country both
economically and socially (see Amsden (1989)). During the period of colonization of the Korean
economy the beneficiaries of its economic expansion was chiefly Japan and Japanese settlers in
Korea. Although the growth rate of the Korean economy during the whole colonial period was
nearly 4 percent per annum, in absolute terms the well being of ordinary Koreans worsened.
Gross Domestic Product per capita increased remarkably, but Gross National product per capita
for Koreans actually decreased. With liberation from the Japanese in 1945 the Koreans were,
therefore, left in dire poverty.

8

Table 3 The Changing Structure of Production, 1960-87
(percentage distribution of GDP in current prices)
Sector

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1987

1. Agriculture
2. Industry
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Utilities
3. Services

39.9
18.6
2.3
12.1
3.5
0.7
41.5

41
24.1
2
17.3
3.6
1.2
34.9

31.1
28.4
1.3
19.1
6.4
1.6
40.5

27.8
33.1
1.5
25.3
4.9
1.4
39.1

14.6
41.4
1.4
29.6
8.2
2.1
44

10.8
43.2
0.7
31.6
8.1
2.8
46

Total (GDP)

100

100

100

100

100

100

Note: Sector classification is based on the World Bank method
suggested in World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, 1988
Sources: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1978,
1989 and New National Accounts, 1986.

The deterioration of the Korean people’s economic welfare during the colonial period can be
traced to a number of factors (see Song (1990)). First, Korea was regarded by the Japanese as a
source of cheap rice. Japanese landowners in Korea during the 1912-31 period shipped about half
the country’s total rice production to feed Japan’s growing industrial workforce (Choi (1984)).
Since a large fraction of Korea’s agricultural output was shipped to Japan, real per capita
consumption by Koreans actually fell during the last decade of the colonial period. Second, the
country’s other resources, such as timber, fishing and mining were exploited for the benefit of the
Japanese economy and not the Korean economy. Third, Korea was used to settle Japan’s surplus
population, and given the best jobs in Korea. The number of Japanese in Korea increased from
170,000 to 770,000 between 1910 and 1945. Fourth, the Japanese used cheap workers from
Korea for the development of Japanese mining and manufacturing industries. Skilled workers
were also transferred to work in Japan. Fifth, Japan used Korea as a base for military training, and
forcibly drafted young Koreans into the Japanese army. Sixth, Koreans were generally restricted
to no more than a primary education. Seventh, Koreans were discriminated against and used in
lower organizational positions and consequently had few opportunities to accumulate experience
as leaders, managers, or negotiators. Hence Korea had a severe lack of competent politicians,
bureaucrats, scholars, entrepreneurs and technocrats. Finally, the period of colonialism resulted in
Koreans being largely isolated from experience in the international arena.
For all the negative features of Japanese colonialism there were some positive impacts as well,
such as education, infrastructure (finance, transportation and commerce), and management
experience in modern organizations (Amsden (1989), p.32, Mason et al. (1980)). Japan also
dismantled one thousand year old dynastic institutions that had held back the advancement of the
country. Koreans learned the Japanese way of doing business and managing the economy, and
9

remain the Asians who understand Japan best. Because of the colonial experience Koreans were
in a position to make selective use of various Japanese institutions. Not surprisingly, Korea’s
experience of rapid development is often compared with that of Japan’s.
Another historical legacy was the division of the country after the Korean War in 1953. Despite
the devastation of the physical infrastructure in both the North and the South, the North was in a
better position to rehabilitate its economy. It had the best mines and most advanced heavy
industries. The South’s legacy was less auspicious, being primarily agricultural, having been
developed by the Japanese as a supplier of cheap foodstuffs for Japan’s industrial workforce. The
country’s capital city, Seoul, had been severely damaged during the period of the war7, with over
80 percent of industrial and infrastructure facilities and over half its dwellings destroyed. In
addition, after the war, the South experienced a flood of refugees from the North, resulting in it
being left with two thirds of the entire Korean population. As stated by Song (1990), p.42 ‘The
South began its national reconstruction with too many people on too little land’. In addition, the
maintenance of its borders required considerable military expenditure.
During the rule of President Rhee Syngman, 1948-60, economic recovery of the war-ravaged
economy was slow and there was no well-articulated economic growth or trade strategy. The
country was heavily dependent upon foreign aid from its allies, most notably the US. Industrial
growth centred on policies relating to import substitution and was based on an overvalued
exchange rate and reliance on massive foreign assistance8, and there was massive investment on
education. As most industries in Korea were consumer goods industries such as food and textiles,
import substitution took place mainly in those industries. Access to foreign exchange, the securing
from the government of subsidies of various types, and quantitative restrictions on imports, were
the key determinants of business success. Access to government controlled foreign exchange,
bank credit, and foreign assistance increasingly involved corruption and favouritism. Businessmen
who became wealthy under these circumstances were widely suspected of corrupt dealings. When
Rhee was ousted in April 1960, public sentiment demanded that such wealth be confiscated and
the malefactors punished. Parliamentary government was established and Chang Myon became
the Prime Minister, but his tenure was short.
3.2

Establishing a growth and economic development strategy 1962-719

In a military coup on 16 May 1961, General Park Chung Hee ascended to power. At this time the
Korean economy remained in dire straits. Most Koreans were poverty stricken, and per capita
income was a mere US$82 in current prices. South Korea lagged behind North Korea both in
terms of per capita income and industrial capacity. Rapid economic development became
imperative, as was the need to identify an appropriate development strategy. The key issues were
as follows. First, Korea had virtually completed import substitution in non-durable consumer
goods and in the intermediate goods used in their manufacture. A growth strategy concentrating
on import substitution in machinery, consumer durables and their intermediate products did not
present a feasible option due to the smallness of the domestic market and large capital
requirements. Second, Korea’s natural resource endowment was so poor that a development
strategy based on domestic resource utilisation was inconceivable. Third, US assistance, which
financed most of the post war Korean reconstruction, peaked in 1957, and was gradually but
continually declining in the early 1960s. Faced with this reduction in foreign aid, Korean policy
7
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makers had to consider how best to expand domestic saving and generate an alternative source of
foreign exchange to finance projects and meet balance of payments requirements. Fourth, the
availability of an abundant, cohesive, and well motivated labour force with a high educational
level10, and relatively low wages, provided the country with an initial comparative advantage in
exporting light manufactured labour intensive consumer goods whose capital, and technology,
requirement was minimal. This was ideal given the country’s shortage of capital. Lastly, there was
the determination of the military leadership to attain a high rate of growth, and a virtual lack of
constraints on its ability to make decisions and to carry them out.
For these reasons the government envisaged that the way forward for the nation was:
industrialisation through externally oriented development 11 ; developing light industry and
infrastructure; and expanding domestic savings and foreign capital accumulation. Consequently,
Korea switched to an externally oriented development strategy from around 1962-63 (Ranis
(1971, 1989)). This also involved relaxing import restrictions. If the government protected the
consumer goods industries on the grounds that these light industries had to expand their exports
and increase import substitution, private enterprises might have found it more profitable to supply
domestic markets rather than foreign markets. Through the policy of relaxing import restrictions
the government reduced the possibility of making a high profit in domestic markets. This policy
attracted businesses to pay more attention to exportability, and at the same time produced
competitive pressure for improved management.
The urgent need to catch up with, and out-perform, the North and to escape from poverty,
necessitated the maximum possible growth, or growth at any cost, and became the basic cause of
the forced expansion of exports and investment throughout the Park era. The government was in
a position to deal as it wished with those businessmen who were suspected of corruption during
the Rhee period. President Park soon reached an understanding with the business community, the
essence of which was that: the government would exempt them from legal punishment; they in
turn would pay off their obligations; and they would devote themselves fully to nation building
through industrialisation. Park was, therefore, able to enlist the support of businessmen for the
industrialisation through export growth strategy, and exert considerable control over them during
the rapid expansion of trade and industrial growth from 1961 until his death in 1979. With
hindsight such an influence enabled the government to bring about rapid economic development in
the country, even thought the domestic market system was still at a very low level of development
and sophistication. It also established a close relationship between government, the banking
system and the large corporations that still endures.
Export targets were agreed upon between the government and individual firms, and were taken by
businessmen as equivalent to compulsory orders. Firms that failed to achieve their export targets,
without a plausible excuse, ran the risk of heavy administrative sanctions. Since the measure of
success for firms was their export capability, firms tended to increase production and export
10
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capacity as much as possible. This ‘forced’ expansion of output and exports resulted in a high and
rising debt-equity ratio 12, as well as distortions in firm internal decision-making. Emphasis was
placed upon the growth of large firms who were seen as being in a better position than small firms
to expand export capacity and acquire and utilise technology, and the government also favoured a
small number of large firms over a large number of small firms because this meant a narrower span
of administrative control. Another reason why large firms were in a better position than small
firms in expanding export capacity was that government owned banks were directed to give
preference to large firms in the allocation of bank credit. From the early days of Korean economic
development when firms were largely financed by bank loans under government influence, a
relationship based system developed among firms, their banks and the government, through
ownership, family ties and political deal making (Dobson (1998)).
On a number of fronts the development strategy proved to be highly successful. Economic growth
which had been between 4 and 5 percent prior to 1962, doubled to an average annual growth rate
of 8.8 percent during 1962 to 1971 (Lee (1996), p.19). Per capita income increased from US$82
in 1961 to US$286 in 1971. The industrial structure of the economy changed dramatically, with
the proportion of the economy accounted for by agriculture and fishing, diminishing from 39.1
percent in 1961 to 27.2 percent in 1971. The manufacturing sector contribution increased from 12
percent to 20 percent of GDP during the same period. Exports increased rapidly, rising from
US$41 million in 1961 to US$1,133 in 1971 (an increase of almost 28 times), producing an
annual average growth rate of 39 percent. There was a massive increase in expenditure on
domestic infrastructure, which laid the foundations for future growth. The rise in the nation’s
GNP pushed up the domestic savings ratio from 21.6 percent of total investment in 1961 to 60.9
percent in 1971, thereby increasing Korea’s internal investment resources (Lee (1996), p.19). The
development strategy also led to increases in employment, income and savings, by enabling the
economy to benefit from economies of scale in production and technology transfer (Smith
(2000b)).
3.3

The heavy and chemical industries (HCI) drive (1972-79)13

Despite the previous impressive outcomes the development strategy changed from the early
1970s, arising from a number of adverse side effects from the export driven growth. First, it
contributed to a sectoral imbalance between the light and heavy industry sectors. Second, the
export oriented industrialization program widened the gap between those engaged in export
business and those in domestic business. Finally, by the early 1970s light industry exports began to
weaken, highlighting the need to develop new exportable products. Consequently, in May 1973,
Korea shifted from general export promotion and incentives to the targeting of heavy and
chemical industries. This had three major objectives. First, to overcome obstacles to the further
growth of the economy the implementation of import substitution policies focusing upon the
development of heavy and chemical industries was thought desirable. Second, the development of
such industries would also provide a source of new export growth industries. Finally, to correct
the imbalance in the manufacturing sector caused by a growth policy that favoured light industry.
Under the HCI drive (1973-9), industry neutral incentives for exports were replaced by industry
specific and, in some cases, firm specific measures (Smith (2000a)). The following HCIs were
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classified as ‘strategic’ – steel, heavy machinery, automobiles, industrial electronics, shipbuilding,
non-ferrous metals and petrochemicals – receiving generous government assistance. The main
tool of promotion was preferential access to bank credit. Over the course of the HCI drive almost
60 percent of total bank loans, and more than 75 percent of total manufacturing investment, went
to these sectors, stifling the flow of funds available to light manufacturing industries and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). Investment, in turn, was funded predominantly by external
borrowings resulting in a rapid rise in foreign debt from 25 percent of GNP in 1970 to 49 percent
in 1980. Other HCI incentives included subsidies, tax reductions and exemptions (Rhee (1994)).
Without such government incentives large companies would not have been willing to bear the risk
and cost of such extensive investment in these industries.
The HCI drive went too far, however, and clear problems developed. The most obvious of which
being associated with the development of the HCI industries themselves. First, their development
contributed to rapid monetary expansion and aggravated the national budget. Second, many
investments were made without sufficient analysis of their viability and impact upon the overall
economy, and there were many overlapping investments. Third, the focus on strategic industries
resulted in enormous economic inefficiency. Fourth, the socialization of bankruptcy risk that
accompanied the HCI drive, combined with the low interest rate ceilings, made the cost of debt
financing very cheap for firms in targeted sectors, encouraging firms to take on excessively high
levels of debt and to increase market share rather than profitability and shareholder value (Huh
and Kim (1994), p.26). Many HCI enterprises expected the government would bail them out since
they had been established at the government’s behest. The result of these was excess capacity,
inefficiency, sectoral imbalance, weakened corporate financial structure, and rising foreign debt
Lee (1996), p.21). The financial status of corporations became more fragile because external
borrowing was rapidly increasing at a rate much greater than that available through internal
financing.
While the industrial conglomerates (chaebol) had already played a major role in Korea’s economic
development during the 1960s, their period of most rapid growth was during the HCI drive. Their
rapid growth and diversification during the 1970s radically transformed the industrial structure
and market concentration in Korea. By 1977, 93 percent of all commodities were produced under
monopoly, duopoly or oligopoly conditions in which the top three producers accounted for more
than 60 percent of market share. Between 1972 and 1982, the share of manufacturing output of
the twenty largest groups increased from 7 percent to 29 percent (OECD (1994), p.60). By 1980,
the ten largest chaebol accounted for 48 percent of GNP (Kim (1997)). In addition, during this
period, technology development began to be recognized as an important development strategy
and only the chaebol had the resources to contribute to this.
The overemphasis on the HCI drive resulted in an overheated economy from 1976 to 1978,
accompanied by a rapid increase in wages that surpassed the growth of labour productivity. This
was exacerbated further by the Middle East construction boom in 1976. Korean construction
companies amassed huge fortunes in the Middle East that was later invested in domestic land,
sending prices sky high. This sequence of events caused one of the country’s worst bouts of
inflation. As inflation continued it weakened export competitiveness, slowed export growth, and
led to slow growth in key export industries and the economy as a whole. Export competitiveness
was also being undermined due to an overvalued currency and under investment in the
development of technology and training of skilled manpower by both the government and the
private sector (Koo (1986), p.19).
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In response to this the government announced the Comprehensive Stabilisation Program on 17
April 1979 (Smith (2000b), p.93). The program included restrictive fiscal and monetary
management, price stabilisation, and investment adjustments in the HCIs in the short term, and
economic liberalization in the long term. The exchange rate was substantially devalued in early
1980 and adjusted in line with fluctuations in the value of currencies of major trading partners
However, during 1979-80 the program was not implemented in an effective way and economic
conditions were further exacerbated due to: the second oil crisis; a bad agricultural harvest, and a
domestic political crisis with the assassination of President Park in October 1979. Prime Minister
Choi Kyu-Hwa became acting President of the interim government but was replaced by General
Chun Doo Hwan under martial law in May 1980. The economic and political crisis during 1980
resulted in the first negative rate of economic growth (-2.1 percent) since the emergence of Park’s
regime (1961-79), and consumer price inflation soared to 28.7 percent.
3.4

Economic stabilization and liberalization (1980-87)

By the early 1980s, against a backdrop of political and economic crises, the economy was
experiencing severe structural difficulties. The massive investment in HCIs and global and
domestic economic downturn combined to leave many of the heavily targeted industries of the
1970s with severe over-capacity problems. In response a critical re-appraisal of the government’s
role in the nation’s overall economic development took place, resulting, once again, in a major
policy shift. The new authoritarian government of President Chun Doo Hwan14 decided to focus
policy upon economic stabilisation and liberalisation, establishing an unbiased incentive structure,
promoting competition within the domestic market and from abroad, and preventing big business
dominance in the market (Rhee (1994)). Korean industrial policy was to be based on the premise
that direct intervention was no longer feasible or desirable in the light of the economy’s changing
industrial structure, and that greater reliance should be placed on private sector decision-making15.
Its focus was now upon trade liberalization, financial liberalization, market opening, promotion of
small and medium enterprises, antitrust legislation, greater opening to foreign investment,
preferences for specific industries were to be reduced, and structural change toward the
development of more technology based industries (Smith (2000a)).
Stabilisation policy outcomes
By the mid 1980s the economic stabilization measures achieved their desired objectives, as
inflation decreased and the economy recovered its competitiveness, productivity and growth.
From 1986 to 1989 economic conditions were given a further boost by favourable external
conditions known, locally, as the three lows – low oil price, weak dollar, and low global interest
rates. In 1986, for the first time in Korea’s modern history, the nation’s current account shifted
into the black, where it remained until 1990, the balance of payments was in sizeable surplus,
exports exceeded imports and domestic savings exceeded domestic investment for the first time
since the First Five Year Plan. The economy registered a high annual growth rate of 12 percent.
Industrial restructuring also made headway with the share of the manufacturing sector in total
GNP 16 rising from 29.7 percent in 1980 to 32.2 percent by 1987. By late 1988, however, a
presidential election, the Olympic Games, abnormally high wages and incomes growth, steeply
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rising land prices, and ongoing structural problems in the economy (Lee (1996), p.26), combined
to severely jolt economic stability. Economic growth slowed to 8 percent in 1989.
Trade liberalisation
Until the 1980s, trade policy formulation contained two features (Smith (2000b), p.94). First,
there was only a weak constituency for trade liberalization. Traditionally, it was only used to
appease trade partners and ensure that export markets remained open. This resistance also tended
to be strongest when the balance of payments was deteriorating. Second, the process of decisionmaking over trade reform remained primarily political rather than economic. Consequently,
Korea’s trade policy tended to be conducted in an ad hoc manner with no central authority within
the government formulating and articulating government trade policies. Import liberalization was
usually undertaken on a micro basis with each commodity considered in isolation and with little
regard for the macro level optimality governing the inter-sectoral allocation of resources (Young
(1988), p.21). Little public debate about the costs and benefits of a trade policy measure to the
national economy took place. Those sectors bearing the costs of protection were left uninformed
and excluded from the decision making process (Young (1986), p.23).
While there was some import liberalization in 1979 the process stalled during 1980 and 1981
following balance of payments difficulties. Only after 1983, when the balance of payments began
to improve, did a substantive trade liberalization program begin. The precursor for this was the
establishment of a Tariff Reform Committee in 1983, which formulated a time-phased program of
import liberalization measures (Smith (2000b), p.93). Priority was directed to liberalizing over
protected commodities first and items that enjoyed a monopolistic market structure (Young
(1986), pp.67-8). As a result of these measures the average nominal tariff rate was lowered from
24 percent in 1983 to 19 percent by 1988 and to 11 percent by 1990, and the import liberalization
ratio rose from 80 percent in 1983 to over 95 percent in 1988. Tariff exemptions were also
abolished for strategic industries in 1984. Many of the trade policy reform measures adopted
during the 1980s were made largely in response to US pressure. Bilateral disputes centred on
Korean macroeconomic policies, especially regarding the won-dollar exchange rate, and its
growing bilateral trade surplus with the US from the mid 1980s.
Industry policy reform and technological upgrading
In the early 1980s the promotion of ‘strategic’ industries with preferential credit and tax treatment
gave way to more indirect and functional support. The number of industries classified as
‘strategic’ decreased, and measures adopted for preferential tax treatment moved from direct
forms such as tax deductions or tax holidays to indirect forms such as the allowance of tax-free
reserves for expenses in technology development (Rhee (1987), p.31). Preferential interest rates
which were formerly applicable to strategic industries or exporters were ‘officially abolished in
June 1982. No interest rate subsidy in ‘explicit’ form for any major loans was conducted and the
size of policy loans was reduced. However, given that credit rationing was still the prime form of
allocating financial resources, access to bank loans still carried inherent preferential benefits (Nam
(1991), p.4).
During this period Korea experienced increased pressure to upgrade and restructure its industry
from labour and capital intensive to technology intensive. A major obstacle to this was a lack of
technological capability in Korean industry necessary to upgrade to higher value added activity.
The closed and concentrated nature of Korean markets meant that Korean enterprises lacked
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incentives to acquire or develop leading–edge technology (Graham (1996)). In contrast to its
interventionist role in HCI industry development in the 1970s, the Korean government adopted a
more facilitatory role towards technological upgrading during the 1980s. Over time the private
sector gradually assumed a much larger role in the country’s R&D efforts partly in response to
increasing international competition and partly in response to a policy environment increasingly
supportive of private R&D activities. R&D expenditure as a share of GNP rose from 0.74 percent
in 1980 to 1.87 percent in 1990. While the private sector accounted for only 26 percent of the
nation’s total R&D expenditure in 1975, the figure increased to 75 percent by 1985. This was one
of the highest proportions of private R&D expenditure among the advanced and newly
industrialising countries (Kim (1997), p.56). Due to their resources the chaebols remained vitally
important to the development of Korea’s technology intensive industries, although, as discussed
below, they remained highly leveraged and highly interdependent financially.
In contrast to a number of other countries in the region, Korea made relatively little use of FDI as
a source of technology transfer during the 1960s and 1970s. Instead it tended to rely more heavily
on external borrowing, technology licensing and the importation of capital goods. In fact, imports
of capital goods, and the transferral of new foreign technologies embodied in them, far surpassed
other means of technology transfer. The size of FDI and its proportion to total external borrowing
were significantly lower in Korea than in other newly industrializing economies. For example,
Korea’s stock of FDI in 1983 was only 23 percent that of Singapore’s, and less than half that of
Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s, while the proportion of FDI to total external borrowing was only 6.1
percent in Korea compared with 91.9 percent in Singapore and 45 percent in Taiwan (Kim
(1997), p.42). In 1980, however, Korea liberalized its inward FDI regulations as a means of
upgrading its technology. In July 1984 the government switched from the previous ‘positive list’
system to that of a ‘negative list’. The government’s more open policy for FDI was aimed at
inducing the transfer of sophisticated new technologies and at promoting market competition for
domestic firms to intensify their innovation activities (Kim (1991), p.226). Of the total US$3.6
billion of inward foreign investment into Korea during the period 1962-86, nearly 50 percent took
place between 1982-86.
Financial liberalisation
Liberalisation of the financial sector began in the early 1980s, and included: privatization of
commercial banks; unrestricted entry of non-bank financial institutions; abolition of the system of
preferential interest rates for strategic or export industries; the introduction of new financial
market instruments; modification of interest rate ceilings; relaxation of directed credit; and the
financial sector was gradually opened to foreign investment 17. While the government permitted
banks greater discretion in setting interest rates and allocating loans, it did not relinquish control
over these. The asset portfolios of commercial banks remained constrained by specific limits on
lending to large companies, and subsidized lending from the central bank still distorted credit
markets. Although the commercial banking sector became largely privately owned after the mid
1980s, the government did not allow it full managerial autonomy (Smith (1998)). Consequently,
banks continued to have little discretion or incentive to control lending risk by screening projects
and monitoring corporate performance. A moral hazard problem existed, where banks believed
that their compliance with government lending directives would result in the provision of financial
assistance should they get into difficulties18. Insider relationships between banks and borrowers
17
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still served to channel credit without regard for rates of return and at rates below the cost of
funding. Declaring any sizeable industrial enterprise as bankrupt or writing off bad loans on bank
balance sheets required the explicit consent of the government.
The regulated financial sector grew rapidly during the first half of the 1980s: total credit increased
from 68 percent of GNP in 1980 to 94 percent in 1984. The major cause was the rapid expansion
of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). The government’s aggressive industrial policy in the
1970s had tended to retard their development 19, however their share in total credit increased from
37 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in 1984. Thus, the less controlled NBFIs contributed much more
to the liberalisation of the financial system than did the still highly controlled banks. The
liberalization of the financial sector resulted in the largest business groups becoming the dominant
owners of commercial banks (nationwide city banks and local banks) and, in particular, of the
NBFIs (short term finance companies, securities corporations, insurance companies etc.). They
also dominated as borrowers from these institutions. At the end of September 1984, for example,
the thirty largest business groups borrowed about 70 percent of the short-term finance companies’
total credit as a result of the decontrols of entry into and ownership participation in the NBFIs.
After 1980 the government attempted to correct the high concentration of commercial bank loans
to large companies and their subsidiaries, by ordering the banks to allocate more credit to SMEs.
They mandated that 55 percent of any local banks’ total credit and 35 percent of the nationwide
city banks’ total credit should be loans to SMEs. In addition, in 1984, the government froze the
share of the thirty largest conglomerates in total bank loans at the end of 1983 level, and did not
allow large firms whose debt-equity ratio exceeded 500 percent further access to bank loans. This
initiative failed, however, as the share of SME borrowing in the net increase of the nationwide city
banks’ total credit decreased from 33.6 percent in 1983 to 27 percent in 1986, failing to reach the
obligatory credit ratio of 35 percent. In fact, the concentration of credit allocation increased: the
ten largest business groups in 1984 were the ten largest borrowers of bank loans; the share of the
thirty largest business groups in total domestic credit (bank loans and payment guarantees)
increased from 43.2 percent as of the end of August 1983 to 48 percent as of the end of March
1984.
This policy failure arose from numerous big businesses20 becoming financially distressed by the
mid 1980s and the government, under duress from these groups, providing them with more
financial assistance through expanded bank credit. Hence the government continued to bail out an
increasing number of troubled firms by forcing the banks to assume their debt (Park (1994),
p.161). In practice the government averted bankruptcy of large enterprises by directing banks to
provide relief loans or rescheduling debt. Banks saddled with a high proportion of non performing
loans continued to depend on the Bank of Korea for low cost funds to support their outstanding
loans, the bulk of which remained policy related (Huh and Kim (1994)). To avert bank insolvency,
the Bank of Korea compensated banks for some of their losses through subsidized rediscounts. At
the end of 1984 the Bank of Korea estimated that commercial bank non-performing loans was
close to 11 percent of their total loans and 2.6 times their net worth. Commercial banks,
therefore, continued to serve as the major channel through which policy directed loans were
mainly distributed (Park and Kim (1994), p.195), despite government intentions of phasing them
out. During 1985-9 policy directed loans were 35 percent of total bank loans (commercial bank
and specialized banks) compared with 41 percent during the height of the HCI drive between
19
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1975-9.
Market concentration and competition
The HCI policy resulted in increased growth and concentration of economic power in the hands
of the chaebol. They monopolized bank loans, seriously harmed the development of SMEs that
formed the backbone of the economy, provided a stumbling block to industrial restructuring,
guaranteed loans to inefficient subsidiaries, and engaged in unfair trade practices such as
discriminating against companies outside their group. While these enterprises had made an
important contribution to the development of the economy they began to stifle competition,
incompatible with the movement toward a more market oriented economy, and imposed a severe
burden on economic growth. Consequently, government policy shifted from the promotion of
chaebol in the 1960s and 1970s to one of regulation of their growth in the 1980s. The
introduction of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of 1980 included: the prohibition of
cartel practices and cross equity investment among affiliated companies; a ceiling on credit to the
larger chaebol; and restrictions on their vertical and horizontal integration by imposing limits on
chaebols’ total equity investment in their group firms21. This was supplemented by measures to
restrict big business expansion through mergers and acquisitions. The government also directed
the 30 largest chaebol to restructure their businesses around three or fewer core sectors (Kim
(1997), p.34).
Despite government policy pronouncements the chaebol continued their fast growth until the mid
1980s. Their economic dominance in the early 1980s can be demonstrated as follows. First, the
share of total manufacturing sales of the 5 largest groups increased from 15.7 percent in 1977 to
23 percent in 1985. Second, the combined sales of the 5 largest chaebols as a percentage of GDP
increased from 12.8 percent in 1975 to 52.4 percent in 1984. Third, in 1983 70 percent of Korea’s
exports were generated by the top ten business groups. Fourth, the average annual growth rate of
sales and assets of the nine largest business groups were 34.5 percent and 27.8 percent
respectively, during the 1979-85 period, while the average growth rates of real GNP and the GNP
deflator were 5.4 percent and 9.9 percent, respectively, for the same period. Finally, the 30 largest
conglomerates controlled 270 firms and contributed about 10 percent of Korea’s GNP in 1985.
However, during this same period their financial structure steadily worsened: 83.5 percent of the
ten largest business groups’ asset growth was financed by debt during the 1979-80 period; their
average debt-equity ratio increased from 356 percent in 1979 to 464 percent in 1985; the average
debt-equity ratio of the thirty largest business groups was 498.5 percent in 1983 in spite of the
continuous regulatory credit management policy towards these conglomerates.
The growth of the chaebol’s did begin to slow around the mid 1980s reflecting the shift in
government policy. The ceilings on bank credit to the top 30 conglomerates imposed in 1986 did
have an impact in significantly reducing the chaebols’ share of total bank lending. Bank loans to
the 30 major chaebols as a share of total credit fell from 24.4 percent in 1987 to 18.3 percent by
1989. However, the share of non-bank credit to the 30 largest chaebols increased from 37.9
percent to 42.1 percent (Park and Kim (1994)).
As the promotion of chaebol faded attention turned more to the promotion of SME
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manufacturing business, in the mid term revision of the Fifth Five Year Plan. In the revised
document covering 1984-86 a separate section was devoted to the promotion of small
manufacturing industries. The efforts to promote the growth of new businesses resulted in the
enactment in 1986 of a special law to support the creation of small firms. Thereafter the number
of manufacturing establishments increased rapidly. Establishments with over 5 employees
increased from 24,957 in 1976 to 44,037 in 1985, according to the census of manufacturing.
However, the Establishment Census of the National Bureau of Statistics put the number of
manufacturing establishments with more than 5 employees at a much higher figure – 76,042 in
1986. In the latter half of the 1980s the government attempted to provide credit preferences for
SMEs. Specific measures to aid SMEs included the requirement that they receive 45 percent of
bank lending and barriers preventing the entry of large firms into certain types of business
activities. These measures boosted the SMEs’ share of value added in the manufacturing and
mining sector, which averaged only 30 percent during the 1970s, to 46 percent by 1990, while
their share of employment increased from 46 percent to 64 percent over the same period (OECD
(1996), p.111).

4.

Productivity or factor accumulation growth - was there an economic miracle in
Korea?

This section reviews the quantitative evidence on the performance of the Korean economy during
its period of rapid economic growth, as discussed in the previous two sections, with the objective
of identifying the contribution to this from productivity growth relative to that of capital and
labour accumulation. A summary of the main results from pertinent studies, within the broader
context of East Asian economic growth, is contained in Table 4.
Table 4. Estimates of Total Factor Productivity growth in East Asia (annual percentage
growth rates)

Period of
study
South
Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
Thailand
Indonesia
Philippines
Japan
Malaysia
Method

Fischer
(1993)

World Bank
(1993)

Young
(1994a)

Young
(1994b)

Young
(1995)

Marti
(1996)

1970-1985

Kim
and
Lau
(1994)
1950-1990

1961-1988

1960-1990

1970-1985

1.7

1966-1991

3.1

1.1

0

3.8

1.5
2.5
0.1

0
0
0

-2.8
1.2
2.5
1.2

Growth
Accounting
(Solow)

3.5
1.1
Econometric
Approach

1970-1990

Collins and
Bosworth
(1996)
1960-1992

1981-1993

1.7

1.4

1.5

2.1

2.6
2.3
0.2

2.1
2.4
1.4
1.6
-0.5
-0.4
0.9
0.4
Econometric
Approach

2.0

1.9
1.2

1.0
Econometric
Approach

1.2

2.9

Econometric
Approach

Econometric
Approach

Econometric
Approach

1.5
1.8
0.8
-0.4
0.9
Growth
Accounting
(Solow)

Osaka
(1997)

0.6
-2.2

Econometric
Approach

Source: Adapted from Cook and Uchida (2002)
The World Bank (1993) study provided support for the high productivity growth thesis relating to
the East Asian economies22. High estimates were obtained for productivity growth, and higher
contributions of TFP to output growth, in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Japan. The
22

The World Bank results were based upon those obtained by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).
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study concluded that this resulted from their superior success in allocating capital to high-yielding
investments, to their catching-up technologically to the industrialized economies, and their pursuit
of export oriented growth strategies. The other group consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore were found to be investment driven with low productivity growth (Page, 1994). The
World Bank claimed that compared with other economies `the East Asian economies stand out
sharply with high absolute levels of total factor productivity' (World Bank (1993), p.55). The
World Bank's position on the sources of growth and success of the East Asian economies falls in
line with the so-called ‘assimilationists’ school. This school is represented by Romer (1993), Pack
and Page (1994), Hobday (1994) and Nelson and Pack (1996), who ascribe the success of the
East Asian developing economies to their ability to acquire and adapt foreign technology. They
argue that these countries developed new skills and learned to use efficiently imported technology.
The assimilationists position is reinforced by recent studies that have also found positive
productivity growth (Marti, 1996; Osaka, 1997, and Sarel (1997)). The study by Osaka (1997),
for example, found significant growth in productivity in South Korea over the period 1981-1993.
The contrasting view, epitomized by the ‘Krugman thesis’, questions the existence of the so-called
East Asian miracle (Krugman (1994)). Krugman argued that capital accumulation rather than
productivity growth was responsible for the rapid economic growth experienced by the East
Asian developing economies. He suggested that the East Asian developing economies achieved
rapid growth `in large part through an impressive mobilization of resources. Once one accounts
for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these countries' growth, one finds little left to explain.
Asian growth ... seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and capital
rather than by gains in efficiency' (Krugman (1994), p. 70). Krugman argued that economies that
relied on the accumulation of factors of production as mechanisms for growth would eventually
experience a slowdown in their growth performance as diminishing returns to factors of
production take their effect. Table 5 indicates the rapid rate of growth of GDP in the East Asian
economies over the period 1965-90 and the rapid rate of growth of capital and labour. From the
sample of selected countries, Korea had the highest average annual GDP growth rate as well as
one of the highest rates of capital and labour accumulation.
Empirical support for the view that the growth of the East Asian developing economies can
largely be explained by the accumulation of factors of production is provided in the works of
Young (1992, 1994b, 1995), Kim and Lau (1994) and Collins and Bosworth (1996) (see Table 4).
They all estimated productivity growth to be low in most East Asian developing economies
except for Young's estimate for Hong Kong in the 1994 study and Taiwan in the 1995 study. Kim
and Lau recorded zero growth for Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The findings of
these studies that capital accumulation in the East Asian developing economies did not result in
significant increases in technological progress that may constitute a catching-up process, has been
labelled the ‘fundamentalists’ approach (Felipe, 1997).
The current state of the debate over the sources of growth for the East Asian developing
economies, therefore, appears to have reached a stalemate (Cook and Uchida (2002)). More
recently, the debate has focused upon the way in which productivity is measured. The measures
of productivity growth in the East Asian developing economies, as identified in Table 4, have
relied either on forms of growth accounting or econometric estimation of a production function.
Both approaches rely on the existence of a production function for the whole economy and on the
validity of marginal productivity theory relating to factor pricing. The former have relied on the
use of Tornqvist indices and Solow's growth accounting approach to estimate the rate of
productivity growth. In the case of Solow TFP is estimated as a residual by separating out growth
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that can be explained by movements along a production function and shifts in it, reflecting
technological and organizational change. The latter approaches have attempted to estimate
directly the production function using a variety of functional forms. The limitations of these
techniques are well known (Nelson, 1981) 23 . Growth accounting is subject to well-known
problems associated with approximation errors while econometric estimation is subject to
measurement error, specification errors relating to the functional form, and the choice of a
particular time period. In particular, production function-based approaches developed to estimate
productivity growth rely on severely restrictive assumptions relating to their analytic framework
and require the explicit specification of the production function and, as a consequence, are likely
to suffer from significant measurement errors which may explain the conflicting results that have
been produced in recent years. As a result further work employing a production function-based
approach to estimation is unlikely to yield results that will be helpful in resolving the apparent
inconsistencies reported in existing empirical work on East Asia (see Felipe (1997)).
Table 5. Average annual growth of GDP, capital and labour, percent, 1965-1990, East Asia
and selected countries
GDP
East Asia Hong Kong
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Singapore
Philippines
Others
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
United States

8.38
5.02
8.95
8.54
6.68
8.94
3.84
2.91
2.43
3.34
2.25
2.68

Capital Labour
5.19
8.84
11.19
12.10
9.12
11.27
4.00
5.07
5.24
4.34
3.65
4.13

3.07
0.99
2.47
2.59
2.78
3.21
2.51
0.89
0.39
0.47
0.50
1.84

Source: Cook and Uchida (2002)

5.

Summary and conclusions

Korea’s economic performance over the period 1962-89 produced a remarkable transformation of
the economy. From being a poverty stricken, inward looking and economically backward
economy in 1960, it was transformed into a globally competitive economy with a GDP per capita
65 times, a GDP 110 times, an export level 1860 times higher by 1989, and with a domestic
savings ratio of 35.4 percent in comparison to only 0.8 percent in 1960. The catalyst for this
remarkable transformation was the adoption of an economic growth and industrialisation
development strategy based upon export expansion, focusing upon the growth of large scale
enterprises who could take advantage of economies of scale and technology transfer in order to
achieve international competitiveness. The government led growth and development strategy
produced remarkable outcomes during the 1960s and 1970s. However, by the early 1980s it was
becoming apparent the limits of this approach and that greater emphasis needed to be placed upon
a market oriented strategy. The focus on large and not small enterprises until 1979 resulted in
23

See also Felipe (1999) for an extensive and critical review of these procedures.
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considerable market concentration and control by the industrial conglomerates. By the 1980s,
with the advancement of the economy to the level of a developed economy, focus by the
government moved away from coercive and discretionary measures, as under President Park, to
the use of more market and non-discretionary measures. The development of a more competitive
and liberalised economy had become paramount, as well as the need to develop technology
intensive industries, and with more focus upon the development of SMEs. The government’s
control of credit allocation fuelled rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, but it also
inhibited the development of an efficient banking system and fostered economic concentration.
While the chaebol represented an important asset in Korea’s industrialization, the absence of a
healthy SME business sector was one of the weakest links in Korea’s overall industrial structure.
By the mid 1980s Korea had become a trade surplus country and mature debtor nation, it became
self sufficient in terms of its domestic financial requirements, and foreign debt also started to
decrease. The future for the Korean economy, at this time, appeared to depend upon how the
country managed its transition to maturity. In this regard, a number of issues appeared to be
especially important: managing trade in the global context; conducting institutional reform;
balancing equity and efficiency; how best to conduct the further transition of the economy from
being government led to market oriented; and how to cope with capital market opening.
However, as the experience of the 1990s began to unfold it was apparent that many structural
problems remained. While the intentions of the reforms in the 1980s were good, they were
insufficiently applied and ultimately flawed.
The empirical evidence on the performance of the Korean economy is inconclusive. However, the
predominant position would suggest that during the period of rapid economic growth from 1962
to the mid 1980s this was primarily driven by factor accumulation. But there is also evidence to
suggest that during the second half of the 1980s productivity growth exerted an increasingly
important influence (see Cook and Uchida (2002)). Nevertheless the economic performance of
the economy during this entire period is a remarkable one and should not be underestimated.
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